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Abstract: Ng (2016) restates his case for the importance of wild animal suffering (1995).
Nevertheless, he suggests that the most effective way to reduce nonhuman suffering overall
is to give short-term priority to the suffering of farmed animals. It is not clear that Ng puts
forward a successful case. Our current efforts to prevent animal suffering overall should also
include raising awareness of wild animal suffering now as well as promoting research on safe
and feasible ways to prevent wild animal suffering in the future.
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Until very recently, animal suffering and death in the wild have not been seen as morally
problematic. It was Yew Kwang Ng’s seminal article in 1995 that triggered awareness about
wild animal suffering, in particular, how it is determined by population ecology. Ng argued
that the dynamics of animal populations are the most important cause of suffering and early
death in the wild. Population dynamics may be optimal for the sake of natural processes, yet
they make animal suffering rather than well-being largely prevail in nature.
In his ASent target article, Ng (2016) revises the implications of accepting this claim. He
suggests that even though wild animal suffering is a moral priority, it is more effective to
focus our concern on the suffering of farmed animals instead:
“Being much more numerous, wild animals are much more important in general and
in the long term. However, as a near-term strategy, I suggest that, without ignoring
wild animals altogether, our initial emphasis should be more on farmed animals, for a
number of reasons” (Ng 2016: 7).
The first reason Ng advances in support of this view is that we are in closer contact with
farmed animals and directly responsible for their suffering and deaths. Thus, Ng concludes,
we are likelier to “gain converts more easily on this front.” It is true that we are directly
responsible for the suffering inflicted on animals under human control, whereas we are not
causally linked in the same way to the natural harms wild animals suffer. According to some
views, this would give us a stronger moral reason to prevent or alleviate the suffering of
farmed animals. However, this is not the kind of consideration Ng has in mind. Rather, his
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argument is based on the effectiveness of strategies for spreading concern about nonhuman
animals.
With that in mind, it is not clear that causal responsibility for harm makes someone more
likely to be persuaded to minimize it, or to stop it altogether, as Ng suggests. In the case of
harms caused by humans to other animals, people may be less willing to undertake big
changes in their daily habits, such as the food they eat. On the other hand, concern for wild
animals does not have such a salient impact on our daily practices. Hence people might be
more inclined to act on it. Surely we lack accurate data to back up either of these
predictions. Until we do, however, it is unclear whether it is strategically preferable to follow
one path (focusing on farmed animals) over another (advocating for animals in the wild as
well).
Ng’s second rationale for emphasizing farmed over wild animal suffering is our limited
knowledge on how to help wild animals today. This is partly true. We currently “have less
knowledge of wild animals and less influence over them” (Ng 2016: 7). Nevertheless, there
are ways of helping wild animals already available to us on a micro or medium scale, such as
rescues, medical intervention to help the injured, vaccination programs, and supplementary
feeding of animals suffering from extreme weather conditions. Moreover, ignorance
regarding large-scale interventions to alleviate wild animal suffering is not a rationale for
emphasizing the suffering of farmed animals over the suffering of those living in the wild. If it
is true, as Ng claims, that due to their high numbers wild animals are much more important
in the long term, Ng provides us with very strong reasons to promote the requisite research
for potential future evidence-based interventions to help them.
Finally, Ng mentions the potential risk of currently focusing on wild animal suffering. Since
interventions to help wild animals could have long-term ecological repercussions, we should
defer measures to help them until a better informed future, according to Ng (2016), “after
much greater concern for farmed animals has become the norm, legally and culturally” (7).
There are several issues at stake here. First, since our concern is with preventing or reducing
animal suffering, the mere fact that a certain intervention in nature may have long-term
ecological repercussions is, in itself, neither positive nor negative. That would depend on
whether its effects on wild animals are, overall, beneficial or detrimental to their well-being.
At any rate, even if one conceded that intervening now would, on many occasions, harm
wild animals more than it would help them, it would still not follow that our focus should be
predominantly on farmed animals. Again, given the long-term importance of wild animal
suffering, that would give us very strong reasons to do research on how to make it more
feasible to carry out future long-term sustained interventions to benefit wild animals.
Second, Ng believes that we can spread concern for wild animals more effectively after more
concern for farmed animals becomes the legal and cultural norm. Yet if it were true that
concern for farmed animals automatically led to concern for wild animal suffering, one might
confidently expect to find great concern for wild animal suffering among, for instance,
animal ethicists. Nevertheless, with some exceptions (e.g., Cowen 2003, Nussbaum 2006,
Horta 2010), animal ethicists usually fail to see that wild animals are in need. Prominent
examples include Regan (2004 [1983]), Clark (1977), Adams and Donovan (2007), Francione
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(2000), and Dunayer (2004). Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) are only partially aware of the
problem. The underlying belief that seems to be shared by these theorists — often referred
to in the literature as “the idyllic view of nature” — is precisely the one that Ng’s seminal
work aimed at debunking, by showing that the aggregate value of wild animal well-being is
net negative.
Thus, even if Ng is right that raising awareness of farmed animal suffering will increase longterm concern for wild animal suffering, it does not follow that people will recognise that
there is also reason to intervene in nature to help. Awareness also needs to be raised about
how animals fare in the wild, by showing the evidence that counters the idyllic view of
nature. People will care about wild animals only to the extent that they know the truth
about their suffering.
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